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Abstract 
Most of the researches performed at the field of earning management were with accrual-based, and the relation 
to other variables with this analysis approach has been analyzed and identified and few studies have been 
conducted with the approach of the actual items. In this article, the researcher analyzes real earning management 
through sales and administration expenses, and long lived assets with administrational efficiencies towards 
signaling like 30-day and 60-days efficiency. Research’s method is post-occurrence-correlation which utilizes 
multiple regressions test for the sake of hypotheses test. Research’s results are emblematic of existent relation 
between earning management’s 30-day-information-efficiency, however, no relation has been observed with 60-
day-efficiency. 
Keywords: Information Efficiency, Real Earning Management, Administrational and Sales Expenses, Long-
term Assets, Production Expenses and Tehran Stock Exchange 
 
1. Introduction 
Net result calculation of an exploitative is affected by accounting’s methods and estimations which provide the 
possibility of manipulation of earning by management, and due to fragments of accounting’s congenial 
restrictions and available inadequacies in estimations procedures and future predictions and the use of different 
methods have resulted in the real earning differing from reported profit in financial inventories, and the issue of 
earning management will be broached. In accrual accounting system, financial events occur without regard to 
reception and payment time resulting from them in recording time. Owing to this, accounting profit is composed 
of two components of cash flow and accrual items in accrual systems. Since managers have more latitude 
regarding revenue recognition time and expenses according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP), it can be concluded that a part of accrual items will be created in the normal process of commercial 
complexes activities (optional non-accrual items) and only a part of these items is exposed to management’s 
manipulation (optional accrual items). Thus, it seems that the flaw coming to accrual accounting system results 
from former parts, so it is expected that the companies which have high level of accrual items undergo more 
expense so as to provide financial security, and they consequently encounter with reduction of stock efficiency in 
the future. From the other side, financial security expenses the increase will bring forth reduction of companies’ 
motivation for foreign financial security. So it is expected that investments in investment assets have more 
sensitivity to the level of accessibility to internal cash flows of the company. Besides this, given the less 
concreteness of accrual items in proportion to cash flows, it is predicted that with the increase of the share of 
these items in accounting profit, investment decisions will have less efficiency. Crating the motivation of the 
manipulation of the current course’s profit, and the expense of profit in future course are one of the concerns of 
managers on current performance. Stein (1989) and Fudeuberg & Tirol (1995) state that this managerial 
pessimism is the result of foreign investing and the analyzers that who rely on current course profit. The 
expected time from future profit and different types of contraction’s commitments such as reward contractions 
based on profit, debt contractions that in most cases is related to reported profit in current course to the extent 
that managers accentuate the increase of linear performance like the cost of stock, and motivation to increase 
current profit by borrowing from future profit for using current course.  
Earning management, management’s general interference in the process of determining profit is towards 
management’s optional goals (Wilde& Bernstein& Subramanyam 2001). Generally, it is imagined that the 
presence of institutional investors might result in companies’ behavioral difference in earning management due 
to their supervisory activities (Karlocbauala1997) and (Loyojnkinz2006), this explains why companies whose 
most stocks belong to institutional investment use earning management to achieve predetermined index of the 
profit with more prediction. Hels &wenorman (1992), Motsoumato (2002), managers aggress to manipulate real 
financial events with the motivation of achieving a verge of a beneficial and given profit or to preserve the last 
year’s situation which causes change in cash flows and even changes accrual items in some respects 
(Roychowdhury, 2004). Schipper (1989) believes that earning management is a purposeful interference in the 
process of financial reporting outside of company with the purpose of fulfilling personal interests. Real earning 
management is predicated on procedures that managers do outside of natural business methods (Cohen, D. & P. 
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(2008) Zarowin). Operating abnormal cash flows (Reshaderi 2006), abnormal sales, public, administrational and 
organizational expenses (Ghani, 2009) are the signs of real earning management existence. To make clear the 
real earning management’s relation and information efficiency, the main emphasis is upon real earning 
management’s profit effect on information efficiency. Given the issues above, the research’s main question is 
formed in this way: does real earning management have connection with information efficiency? Or in other 
words, does the given information efficiency of investors occur considering real earning management’s policies 
through real activities? In this study, real earning management is utilized with three approaches, ‘real earning 
management through administration and sales expenses, production and long term assets. 
 
2. Research’s Literature 
Real financial events’ manipulation is used as deviating normal operating activities of company by managers 
who mislead beneficiaries. The aforementioned deviation of manager will help in achieving financial reporting 
goals, but it doesn’t increase the companies’ value. Real financial events manipulation methods will help 
managers such as the reduction of sale’s cost with the purpose of increasing sale’s production, or the reduction of 
optional expenses in economical crises that are of appropriate methods. However, the manager’s widespread and 
abnormal uses of these methods are illustrative of managers’ declination to earning management through 
financial events (Roychowdhury, 2006). Real earning management is predicated upon opportunistic timing and 
structuring of operational contractions, financial and investment supply by commercial complexes management 
with the purpose of influencing reported profit towards special direction that the company will undergo future 
economical expenses and consequences, firm evidences are related to this issue that to achieve goals related to 
their commercial complex’s profit, managers will proceed to real earning management and optional accrual 
items of earning management. Optional accrual items management is predicated upon manager’s opportunistic 
use from available flexibility in accounting’s accepted principle for the sake of changing reported profit, without 
causing any change in company’s infrastructural cash flows (chen,J.Z, 2009) earning management is through 
accrual items including usage of accounting methods for manipulating the profit; while, earning management 
through real events methods includes changing contraction’s timing and structure so as to manipulate the profit. 
Thus, it can be concluded that making the accounting standards precise will decrease accrual items manipulation 
and it might not have any influence on real financial events, and it can even cause its increase. In other words, in 
spite of firm accounting standards (or more obligations), managers, from earning management, change approach 
through accrual items to earning management through real financial events which is costly and decreases 
company’s value; since such activities can have negative influences on cash flows of future courses. For 
instance, product’s sales price decrease with the purpose of increasing sales volume causes customers to expect 
such decreases in future courses that may result in the decrease of sales profit verge in future courses. Extra 
production will also result in the increase of goods inventory and preservation expenses (Graham et al, 2005) of 
important differences of two aforementioned methods are earning managements through real financial events 
against earning management through accrual items happening mostly during fiscal year. When manager predicts 
that she won’t reach the given profit, and he is confronted with restrictions in the usage of accrual items 
manipulation, he manipulates real financial events. To reach a clear profit goal, managers can wait till the end of 
fiscal year, and they can use optional accrual items with the purpose of earning management. But the danger of 
this method is that the level supposed to be manipulated might be bigger than optional accrual items. Thus, it the 
goal of the given profit might not be fulfilled through this method at the end of the fiscal year. So, managers 
decrease this danger through real financial events manipulation during fiscal year (Yu, 2008). 
 
3. Research Background 
Thomas and Zang (2002) analyze the balance between accrual items manipulation and real profit’s management 
of the profit. They showed that the managers prioritize the decisions concerning real activities manipulation in 
proportion to accrual items manipulation. Research’s results are emblematic of real activities manipulation’s 
direct connection with related expenses to accrual item’s manipulation. 
Ort and Wagonhofer (2005) research’s results illustrate that managers, in spite of available strict standards, use 
real earning management instead of using accounting management’s profit. 
Ghani (2005) states that the assets’ sales timing can be used as a method towards reported earning management. 
Fixed asset’s sales timing is one of the options of management’s development of every company, and related 
profit and loss during sales will be reported in the face of profit and loss, the evidence resulted from this study is 
illustrative of management’s development opportunities towards manipulation in the profit.  
Gramm and the collaborators’ research’s result (2005) shows that the managers prefer real earning 
management’s activities in comparison with accrual items management. This is why management’s real 
activities can be unpredictable than commercial optimum decisions, and as a result its discovery more difficult, 
however, expenses available in these activities might be more important for company from economical point of 
view. They reached this result that accepted operational cash flows for deferring or decreasing the budget of 
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travelling and preservation expense will result in transformation or investing investment omission (for abstaining 
from depreciation expenses), transforming assets into bonds that can be traded and payments supply 
management of retirement designs. 
Reshaderi (2006) follows earning management discovery through real operational manipulation. The main focus 
of the study is on Operating Cash Flow (OCF), production expenses, and optional expenses. These are the 
variables that are rather free from the effect of accrual items’ manipulation. To determine the normal levels of 
these variables, by using an ordinary model, researcher shows that the companies that report positive annual 
profits , their OCF is strangely low, and their production expenses are strangely high. This research’s evidences 
show that by presenting reasonable discounts for sales’ transitory increase and by inordinate production for 
decreasing sold item’s finished price, companies avoid reporting the loss. Besides, companies decrease optional 
expenses for reporting more margin profit. Variety analysis in essence and the degree of real operational 
manipulation among companies will elucidate these cases: companies whose current asset level is traditionally 
low will act more aggressively in presenting discount and decreasing optional expenses. Manufacturing 
companies will more probably act in ways that will result in the strange increase of production expenses relation 
(the total of sold item’s finished price) to their sales. 
Roy Chodheri (2006) focuses on real activities manipulation in a way that he views real activities manipulation 
as managerial action that diverts from normal operation activities process of commercial complex. It happens 
with the purpose of misleading special stock holders. According to Chodheri’s study, managers present 
reasonable discounts in order to increase their own sale transitorily, they also decrease their optional expenses in 
order to improve the margin of reported profit and they intend to increase production so as to decrease sold 
item’s finished price. For instance, when the managers tend to present remarkable discount at the end of the year 
so as to increase the company’s sale, the volume of manufactured differential sale will be destroyed at the time 
of reenacting the past prices. Actually, this action will transmit the future earning to the current course; as a 
result, the future earning will be deteriorated by sales management. Generally, manipulating real activities occurs 
through wide complex of operational decisions that can have important economical effect on operational 
performance. 
Mizik and Jackobson (2007) found in their research that the companies that have more tendencies for earning 
management through real activities manipulation will gain very lower stock’s future output than other countries.  
Chen and the collaborators (2007) analyzed the possessive expenditure (reward) that the market was giving to 
the companies that made the result of their own operations nearer to analysts’ prediction. They analyzed 8977 
stock companies of New York during 1987 -2006 . The results showed that the market’s expenditure exists for all 
companies that it makes company nearer to analyst’s prediction by using earning management. But this reward 
will fall as much as 1/3 for the companies that use real earning management. 
Zang (2007) in the analysis of this issue that which one of the managers uses earning management through 
accrual items, and which one uses earning management through real activities proved that the manipulation of 
real activities has PRECEDENCY over accrual item’s manipulation. Zang analyzed potential expenses of 
accounting’s manipulation (accrual items) and finally stated that companies that have more risk of juridical 
litigation have more inclination for manipulating real activities. He also found out that the companies’ managers 
use real activities manipulation and accrual item’s manipulation as a substitution for each other. Manipulating 
real activities has positive relation with accrual item’s manipulation, and accrual item’s manipulation has 
negative relation with real activities manipulation. 
Yo’s findings (2008) are emblematic of this matter that strong motivation for earning management will 
manipulate real activities more than other companies. The result of study also shows that real activities 
manipulation might damage company’s economical value in long term. 
Cohen and Zaroin (2008) analyzed activities related to accrual item’s management and real earning management 
around stock’s secondary supply. The result of this research showed that operational procedure of the companies 
that have attended real management around stock’s secondary supply has decreased rather than the companies 
that have used accrual item’s management for their own earning management.  
Kim and Soon (2009) studied about real earning management against accounting management and investment 
and concluded that investment’s expense has positive relation with real earning management earning accounting 
management, but this relation is more meaningful than earning’s real management. 
Cohen, Dee, Lee analyze this issue in their study that specialist customers of specialist auditors of industry who 
have earning management motivation are stuck in impasse for manipulating accrual items; therefore, they 
probably manipulate real operations. They analyze companies’ operational efficiency suspected of manipulating 
real operations as well.  His findings show that customers of specialist auditors of industry have earning 
management motivation, their absolute power of accrual items is less than the companies which have earning 
management motivation, and they don’t undertake specialist auditor’s of industry. These specialist auditors of 
industry will most probably manipulate real activities which is the emblematic of unfavorable potential 
consequences of using specialist auditors of industry. Found evidences illustrate that future operational 
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efficiency companies suspected of manipulating real operations is less than the companies which are not 
suspected of manipulating real operations. 
Jey and Kim (2010), real earning management (real activities management, or trade oriented earning 
management) occurs when management undertakes some actions for manipulating earnings that are beyond 
ordinary commercial processes. In comparison with artificial earning management, real earning management 
carries more ambiguity earning, and its discovery is difficult for stockholders, auditors, and legal authorities; 
therefore, its next legal consequences will probably be lesser.  
Taylor Vajohai (2010) concluded in his analysis that real earning management through manipulating real 
activities will result in meaningful effect in future operational efficiency of the company.  
Chimpan concluded that the companies in the last three months of the year fulfill the earning’s goals through 
manipulating real activities such as lowering the price with the purpose of sales temporary accelerating. 
Companies in competitive positions also show more reaction than earning management’s motivation. 
Jao and collaborators (2011) analyze protection’s effect through confiscating possession on real earning 
management, and future operational procedure. The results of this study show that the companies that are less 
under possessive confiscation have higher level of real earning management, and these countries have less future 
operational efficiency. 
  
4. Research Objectives 
1- Real earning management’s relation analysis through managing administrative, public and sales expenses 
with information efficiency (30 and 60 days) in accepted companies in Tehran’s Stock Exchange 
2- Real earning management’s relation analysis through managing production expenses with information 
efficiency (30 and 60 days) in accepted companies in Tehran’s Stock Exchange 
3- Real earning management’s relation analysis through managing through long term assets sales (30 and 60 
days) in Tehran’s Stock Exchange 
 
5. Research Hypotheses 
Research Hypotheses that are compatible with research’s title are edited as follows: 
1- There is a connection between real earning management and information efficiency. 
Minor hypotheses resulted from research are as follows: 
1- There is meaningful linear relation between real earning management through managing 
administrational, public, and sales expenses with information efficiency (30 and 60 days). 
2- There is meaningful linear relation between real earning management through managing production 
expenses with information efficiency (30 and 60 days). 
3- There is meaningful linear relation between real earning management through managing long term 
asset’s sales with information efficiency (30 and 60 days). 
 
6. Research Methodology 
The present paper is a branch of casual researches with correlation procedure, and is of the developmental-
functional type which analyzes linear relation between research’s variables, and F and T components are used for 
related tests by the credit of models and their coefficients. Research’s statistical society is comprised of all the 
accepted companies in Tehran’s Stock Exchange, and 61 companies are selected during 1388 until 1390 by 
applying required conditions and limitations as selected statistical samples. Research data from published reports 
by Tehran’s Stock Exchange and Rah Novin software package, and websites WWW.rdis.ir and 
WWW.irbourse.com are compiled. Information analysis are done by Excel and SPSS16. 
1.6 Research Variables 
In this study, real earning management as independent variable and information efficiency as dependent variable 
and firm measure variables, Amihud illiquidity ratio, Natural logarithm of share turnover as control variables are 
taken under consideration. 
Real Earning Management influences operational pecuniary flows directly, and decreases the value of the 
company in long term. In this kind of management, by adopting some operational decisions, or in other others 
manipulating real activities, managers have recourse to real eraning management, and gain their given profit. In 
this study, to measure this kind of management, three presented proxies are used below: 
Ordinary level’s estimation model of administrational, public, and sales expenses 
By following Anderson and collaborators (2003) the formula below is used to estimate ordinary level of 
administrational, public, and sales expenses: 
 
SG&At= administrational, public, and sales expenses 
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St= pure sale 
DSt= virtual variable for increasing sales that if  Sj,t<Sj,t-1, then it is equal with one, i.e. when sales salary 
decreases between the years t and t- it equals one, otherwise zero. 
The model above controls cohesion behavior of expenses. Cohesive cost is a type of cost whose measure of 
increase, when sales cost increases, is more than its decrease when sales cost decreases to the same extent. 
Anderson analyzed administrational and public expenses against sales, and he found that differences between 
them are not equal, in other words, administrational, and public expenses are considered as cohesive expenses; 
because they are comprised of items that do urgent management even in the face of decline of sales cost. 
Ordinary level’s estimation model of production expenses: by following Roychodheri model (2006). 
 
Utilized variables in these models are as follows: 
Prodt= finished value of sold item (COGS,t) + in stock variation of the first course and the end of the course 
( Inventory)  
St=pure sale 
St = t year’s sales variation with t_1 year’s sales  
At-1= the total of company’s assets at the end of t_1 course 
Ordinary level’s estimation model of non-operational profit resulting from long term assets’ sale by following 
Ghani (2005) 
 
GLAt= advantages and disadvantages resulting from the sale of properties, machineries, equipments, and long 
term investment 
PPESalest= properties, machineries, equipments’ sales price 
ISalest= long term assets’ sales price  
St= t year’s sales variation with t_1 year’s sales  
At-1= the total of company’s assets at the end of t_1 course 
Information Efficiency (dependent variable) 
In the present study the standards below will be used for calculating information efficiency: 
1 -11-2-1  thirty-day-information efficiency 
R30,t=


*100 
R30,t= -stock price output in day 30 of t month 
Pt= stock price in day 30 of t month 
Pt-1= stock price in day 30 of t-1 month 
Price output of day 1 in each month 
R1t=


*100 
R1t= every month’s first say output 
Pt= every t month’s first day stock price 
Pt-1= every
 
t-1 month’s last day stock price 
After calculating the day 30 of every month (for every company) variance output is calculated separately for 
every outputs, then the first day variance will be divided on variance day 30 (for company’s each day. Through 
this information efficiency IE1 (1 and 30) will be calculated. 
IE2 efficiency (a and 60) will be calculated by this similar method, with the difference that of 60 day price output 
instead of 30 day price output. 
Firm Size 
There are different variables to measure “Firm Size” variable that are as follows: 
The value of all properties, the measure of sales, and the number of total staff, natural logarithm of share 
turnover 
In this article, natural logarithm of share turnover is used to measure “Firm Size” variable that as a natural 
logarithm the number of shares multiplied with share price will be calculated at the end of the year.  
Amihud illiquidity ratio 
Amihud illiquidity ratio will be calculated by monthly definite share’s mean output in every Rial for the volume 
of trades. The aforementioned criteria for 12-month-course are calculated according to fiscal year. 
| 爘
 
r tILLiquidity average
volume t
=
  
ILLiquidtly= illiquidity ratio 
Rt= share’s output in t course 
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Vt=share’s volume of trades in t course 
5-11-1 Share’s movement’s natural logarithm 
The number of traded shares divided in the number of shares in the hand of shareholders will be obtained via 
logarithm. The calculation is occurred according to fiscal year in a twelve-month-course. 
TURN=Ln(	
		
	
	
	
		
) 
 
7. Research Result 
First we tend to analyze the analytical-descriptive results of research variables that are central and scattered 
indices, and they are described in table 1and are observable. 
 
7.1 The Analysis of Data’s Normalcy 
To analyze data’s normalcy, Kolmograph-Smirnoff (KS) is used using SPSS software whose results is shown in 
table 2 for all dependent and independent variables. 
Table 2: Normal Distribution Test  
Index Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  
P-
Value Result  
30 day efficiency  0.87  0.12  0.097  Accepted   - Normal 
60 day efficiency  0.93  0.07  0.067  Accepted   - Normal 
Amihud liquidity ratio  681.7601  2630.64396  0.000  Failed-
abnormal  
Natural Logarithm  2.6037 -  0.90090  0.270  Accepted-Normal  
Firm Size  24.7051  1.89500  0.000  Accepted  - Normal  
Real earning management using sales, administrational 
and  organizational expenses  0.5510  0.26247  0.855  
Accepted  - 
Norma  
Real earning management using production expenses  2.9382  1.06072  0.749  Accepted  - Norma  
Real earning management using production expenses 
long term assets  0.0359 -  0.15068  0.000  
Failed-
abnormal  
 
Given the table 2 results, dependent variable of information efficiency (30 day and 60 day) have normal 
distribution (Sig more than 5 percent). To perform regression test, it required that dependent variables have 
normal distribution; therefore, dependent variables of this research have normal distribution, and they can be 
used as regression model. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Research Variables Description  
Index Variable  mean  Median  Variance  Standard Division  Max Min observations  
Real earning management 
using production expenses  2.9382  2.8254  1.125  1.06072  1.58  0.07  61  
Real earning management 
using sales, administrational 
and  organizational expenses  
0.5510  0.5528  0.069  0.26247  6.41  0.70  61  
Real earning management 
using production expenses 
long term assets  
0.0359 -  0.0118  0.023  0.15068  0.08  1.08 -  53  
30 day efficiency  0.8679  0.8960  0.015  0.12261  1.02  0.044  61  
60 day efficiency  0.926632  0.952871  0.005  0.0674  1.00  0.71  61  
Amihud liquidity ratio  0.0681  0.0033  0.069  0.2630  18655.82  0.09  61  
Natural Logarithm  2.6037 -  2.4849 -  0.812  0.90090  0.28  6.69 -  61  
Firm Size  24.7051  24.7434  3.591  1.89500  29.42  20.30  61  
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7.2  Correlation Test among Variables 
In table 3, Pearson and Spearman coefficients are used for correlation between dependent and independent and 
supporting variables  
Table 3: Correlation Test among Variables 
   RMT Production  Assest  
Amihud 
illiquidity 
ratio 
  
Market 
Size  
Natural 
Logarithm 
of Stock 
Market 
Value  
Information 
Efficiency 
(30day)  
Correlation 
Coefficient  0.017-  0.136  0.199-  0.331-  0.307  0.092-  
Sig  0.897  0.295  0.154  0.009  0.016  0.482  
Result  
Failed-
non-
correlation  
Failed-
non-
correlation 
Failed-
non-
correlation 
Accepted-
Correlation 
Existence  
Accepted-
Correlation 
Existence  
Failed-non-
correlation  
Information 
Efficiency 
)60(  
Correlation 
Coefficient  0.002  0.199  0.002  0.349-  0.190  0.169-  
Sig  0.987  0.123  0.987  0.006  0.142  0.193  
Result  
Failed-
non-
correlation 
Failed-
non-
correlation 
Failed-
non-
correlation 
Accepted-
Correlation 
Existence  
Failed-non-
correlation 
Failed-non-
correlation 
 
Table 4 results are emblematic of 30 day information efficiency correlation non-existence with independent 
variables of research (RMT, Production & Assets) and supporting variables of stock market value’s natural 
logarithm when there is meaningful correlation with supporting variable of Amihud illiquidity ratio and firm 
size. As regards 60 day information efficiency, there is still non-correlation between independent variables of the 
research, and like 30 day efficiency, there is a meaningful correlation between Amihud liquidity ratio and firm 
size. Supporting variables of stock market value’s natural logarithm have no meaningful correlation. 
7.3 Hypotheses Test 
Multiple regression testing is used for hypotheses test of the research. Given that there are two approaches of 30-
and 60-day-information efficiency in information efficiency field in this research, every hypothesis is tested by 
these two approaches. 
7.3.1 The First Hypothesis Test 
Hypothesis: There is a meaningful linear between information efficiency and real earning management through 
administrational and sales expenses. 
Now, 30-day and 60-day-information efficiency is used for the first hypothesis test. First hypothesis test results 
are shown in table 4. 
Table 4. First Hypothesis Test  
  IE(30) IE(60) 
Correlation Coefficient  0.458  0.246  
Determination Coefficient  0.210  0.060  
Regulated Determination Coefficient  0.153  -0.07  
Estimation Standard Error  0.127  0.067  
Durbin Watson Coefficient 1.537  1.588  
F Statistic 3.719  0.9  
Sig  0.009  0.470  
 Beta  T P-Value  Beta  t P-Value  
C 0.503  2.515  0.015  0.842  7.017  0.000  
ILLIQ  1.21 -  2.159-  0.035  4.393-  1.299-  0.199  
Size  0.019  2.399  0.020  0.004  0.916  0.363  
Turn  0.029  1.742  0.087  3.228  0.003  0.997  
RMT 0.005-  0.370-  0.713  0.006-  0.737-  0.464  
 
 We analyze Table 4 results in two approaches of -and 60-day-information efficiency in information efficiency. 
30-day-information efficiency 
Given the table 1 results, Durbin Watson Coefficient (1.537) is the emblematic of errors’ independency, 
correlation coefficient (0.458), and determination coefficient (0.210), and Sig (0.009) are illustrative of Sig 
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relation between 30-day-efficiency and real earning management through administrational and sales expenses. 
Thus, we can conclude that the first hypothesis will be accepted with the approach of 30-day-information 
efficiency in 95% certitude level. Given the component t and P-value related to Beta coefficient, Amihud 
liquidity and firm size have the most effect in regression model. 
60-day-information efficiency 
Given the table 1 results, Durbin Watson Coefficient (1.588) is the emblematic of errors’ independency, 
correlation coefficient (0.246), and determination coefficient (  -0.07 ), and Sig (0.470) are illustrative of Sig 
relation between 60-day-efficiency and real earning management through administrational and sales expenses. 
Thus, we can conclude that the first hypothesis will be accepted with the approach of 60-day-information 
efficiency in 95% certitude level. We can conclude that linear relation between 60-day-information efficiency 
and real earning management through sales and administrational expenses will not be confirmed. 
7.3.2 The Second Hypothesis Test 
Hypothesis: there is a linear relation between information efficiency and real earning management through 
production expenses. 
Now, 30-day and 60-day-information efficiency is used for the first hypothesis test. First hypothesis test results 
are shown in table 5. 
Table 5: Second Hypothesis Test  
  IE(30) IE(60) 
Correlation Coefficient  0.481  0.246  
Determination Coefficient  0.231  0.061  
Regulated Determination Coefficient  0.176   -0.007  
Estimation Standard Error  0.111  0.067  
Durbin Watson Coefficient 1.665  1.673  
F Statistic 4.206  0.902  
Sig  0.005  0.469  
 Beta  T P-Value  Beta  t P-Value  
C 0.371  1.733  0.089  0.784  6.026  0.000  
ILLIQ  1.149-  2.0564 -  0.044  4.148-  1.221-  0.227  
Size  0.022  2.732  0.008  0.006  1.126  0.265  
Turn  0.034  2.076  0.042  0.030  0.278  0.782  
Production 0.076  1.297  0.200  0.026  0.740  0.462  
 
We analyze Table 5 results in two approaches of -and 60-day-information efficiency in information efficiency. 
30-day-information efficiency 
Given the table 1 results, Durbin Watson Coefficient (1.665) is the emblematic of errors’ independency, 
correlation coefficient (0.481), and determination coefficient (0.231), and Sig (0.005) are illustrative of Sig 
relation between 30-day-efficiency and real earning management through administrational and sales expenses. 
Thus, we can conclude that the first hypothesis will be accepted with the approach of 30-day-information 
efficiency in 95% certitude level. Given the component t and P-value related to Beta coefficient, natural 
logarithm of share turnover and firm size has the most effect in regression model. 
60-day-information efficiency 
Given the table 1 results, Durbin Watson Coefficient (1.673) is the emblematic of errors’ independency, 
correlation coefficient (0.246), and determination coefficient (0.061), and Sig (0.469) are illustrative of Sig 
relation between 60-day-efficiency and real earning management through administrational and sales expenses. 
Thus, we can conclude that the first hypothesis will be accepted with the approach of 60-day-information 
efficiency in 95% certitude level. We can conclude that linear relation between 60-day-information efficiency 
and real earning management through sales and administrational expenses will not be confirmed. 
7.3.3 The Third Hypothesis Test 
Hypothesis: there is a linear relation between information efficiency and real earning management through Long 
term assets. 
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Now, 30-day and 60-day-information efficiency is used for the first hypothesis test. First hypothesis test results 
are shown in table 6. 
Table 5: Third Hypothesis Test  
  IE(30) IE(60) 
Correlation Coefficient  0.443  0.322  
Determination Coefficient  0.196  0.104  
Regulated Determination Coefficient  0.129  0.290  
Estimation Standard Error  0.116  0.061  
Durbin Watson Coefficient 1.684  1.679  
F Statistic 2.932  1.389  
Sig  0.030  0.252  
 beta  T P-Value  beta  t P-Value  
C 0.502  2.299  0.026  0.779  6.805  0.000  
ILLIQ  1.187-  2.025-  0.480  4.418-  1.436-  0.157  
Size  0.018  2.063  0.045  0.007  1.499  0.154  
Turn  0.029  1.707  0.094  0.003  .0350  0.728  
Asset 0.004  0.033  0.974  0.048  0.844  0.403  
 
We analyze Table 6 results in two approaches of -and 60-day-information efficiency in information efficiency. 
30-day-information efficiency 
Given the table 1 results, Durbin Watson Coefficient (1.684) is the emblematic of errors’ independency, 
correlation coefficient (0.443), and determination coefficient (0.196), and Sig 0.030) are illustrative of Sig 
relation between 30-day-efficiency and real earning management through administrational and sales expenses. 
Thus, we can conclude that the first hypothesis will be accepted with the approach of 30-day-information 
efficiency in 95% certitude level. Given the component t and P-value related to Beta coefficient, natural 
logarithm of share turnover and firm size has the most effect in regression model. 
60-day-information efficiency 
Given the table 1 results, Durbin Watson Coefficient (1.679) is the emblematic of errors’ independency, 
correlation coefficient (0.322), and determination coefficient (0.104), and Sig (0.252) are illustrative of Sig 
relation between 60-day-efficiency and real earning management through administrational and sales expenses. 
Thus, we can conclude that the first hypothesis will be accepted with the approach of 60-day-information 
efficiency in 95% certitude level. We can conclude that linear relation between 60-day-information efficiency 
and real earning management through sales and long term assets will not be confirmed. 
 
8. Research Findings 
Research results are emblematic of non-existent REM relation with 60-day-information efficiency in 3 different 
approaches of REM and the existence of relation with 30-day-efficiency, each of them are as follows: 
There is a meaningful relation between REM through manipulating public, administrational, and sales expenses 
with 30-day-effciency, Matsonaga and Park (2010) sate that there is an expectation of negative relation existing 
among manipulating profit through real items and future performance of the companies, particularly, companies 
are  suspected of manipulating the profit, because opportunist managers result in the increase of company’s share 
price, job security and their own reward by taking advantage of accounting procedures or optional activities that 
these actions will finally result in other beneficiaries’ loss. 
There is not a meaningful relation between REM through manipulating public, administrational, and sales 
expenses with 60-day-effciency, it can be claimed that the oscillation of share’s price is high in 60-day duration. 
In real earning management through public and expenditure sales expenses whose implementation is mostly in 
management’s authority goes up and down, companies can decrease reported expenses and increase the profit. 
Even in the courses when the profit of the course is more than the management’s given profit (goal), the 
aforementioned expenses might increase (Rodichordri, 2006). 
There is a meaningful relation between REM through manipulating information efficiency. 
There is a meaningful relation between REM through manipulating production expenses with 60-day-efficiency. 
Given the hypothesis rejection, it can be stated that since in this method management has strived for too much 
production (more than requirement), and tries to show a decent image of the company’s efficiency. When there 
is too much production, the stable burden expense will be descending, and every unit’s expenses will drop 
(Moradzade and Adili, 1389). If share’s price is not capable of production effect’s complete reflection on 
company’s future operational efficiency, negative relation between abnormal expense of the production and 
share’s future output is expected. Given the obtained results from this hypothesis, and non-correlation existence 
between real earning management from production expenses with information efficiency of this claim will be 
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rejected. There is a meaningful relation between REM through long term asset’s sales with information 
efficiency. 
There is not a meaningful relation between REM through long term asset’s sales with information efficiency. 
Managers synchronize stable assets sales and their own investments in earning management through stable assets 
and long term assets with the purpose of achieving the given profit. Although the clerical value of restoration 
assets are not analyzed, it is less than their market’s value (sale), manager can manipulate the profit of the 
current course (smoothening, additive earning management, and declining earning management) by assets sales 
and identifying the produced profit from the increase of assets value in the given course. Assets sales usually 
occurs with this method at the end of year (Jo, 2007), and since it is stated information efficiency, shares price is 
illustrative of all the available information in the market change as soon as new information enter market of the 
prices. Given the aforementioned issues, since assets sales occur at the end of the fiscal year, and share’s price 
changes at the end of the fiscal year, and new information enters the capital market, it is thus logical to have no 
relation between information efficiency and sales manipulation of long term asset. 
Total results show that managers in real earning management change the undertaking of the operation time, the 
way of resources’ allocation, or the time of investment projects’ implementation, management based on accrual 
items has no direct consequence on cash flow (Cohen and Zarobin, 2008). Real earning management has direct 
impact on company’s cash flows, in this method, cash will be the victim of accrual profit, and its most important 
loss will be the annihilation of company value due to the decrease of the future cash flows. Accrual items 
management is not free from expenses. The discovery of accrual item’s manipulation can bring forth the 
probability of the need for special analyses fro auditors’ side, and it can also result in financial punishments from 
legal entities (like Stock Exchange), the necessity for further presentations of profit and the analysis of the issue 
in legal courts. In real world, a phenomenon might be affected by factors and numerous variables. Some of these 
factors and variables are known for the researcher and can determine these factors to some extent on phenomena 
under analysis. However, there are some other factors that can affect phenomena under analysis that the 
researcher is not aware of them, or there is no possibility of determining their effect on variable under analysis. 
In this research the output of accepted companies’ share in Tehran Stock Exchange is studied as dependent 
variable, a variable that can be changed under the effect of numerous factors. One of the important and 
primordial issues can justify non-relation between cash flows resulted from operational activities that real 
earning management has effect on and can be companies’ share output and is the emblematic of oscillation in 
stock exchange market. In this direction, the effect of some stimulants of accepted companies’ share in stock 
exchange such as gossip, political currents, pricing less than real share at the time of preliminary presentation to 
the public cannot be ignored. Besides, share’s profit in cash also as one of the constitutive factors of share’s 
output in different companies is under the numerous effects, such as management policies as regards profit 
division, liquidity condition, future development plans, the combination of shareholders and etc. These changes 
in cash profits’ division of different companies can cause remarkable differences to share output. 
Hypotheses results of real earning management, with 30-day-efficiency in direction with Ghani’s research 
(2005), Miziko Jackobson (2007), Lee (2010), Rabii (1390), Akbare Javan (1390), Mirzaii (1392) are in contrast 
with Valizade Larijani’s (1389). 
Hypotheses results of real earning management, with 60-day-efficiency in direction with Kochaki’s research 
(1373), Azaam Valizade (1389) whose research’s results show that there is no meaningful relation between real 
earning management with future cash flows, and they are in contrast with Rakhshani’s research (1384). 
 
9. Conclusion 
Given that discovery of real earning management by auditor is done with difficulty, it is suggested that Iran’s 
official accounting society and accounting organization as active ones in accounting generation in country make 
the companies under consideration aware of the earning management’s future consequences of real activities’ 
manipulation by training their auditors. Stock exchange organization should also in some ways introduce the 
potential investors, and the companies that have recourse to real earning management to investors by informing 
them correctly in order that they attend investment or non-investment in such companies with awareness and in 
balance with their short term and long term goals. 
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